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STRUGGLING TO ESCAPE FROM ASSUMPTION 14*
Benjamin M. Friedman**
At least four hypotheses, none mutually exclusive, have emerged to explain the origins of
the financial crisis that began in the United States in 2007:  (1) Managers of financial institutions,
or their employees, may have engaged in criminal activity.  (2) Principal/agent conflicts may
have given the managers of financial institutions incentives to undertake activities that, though
legal, nonetheless exposed their institutions and their shareholders to excessive risk that the
shareholders would not have chosen.  (3) The operation of government in a variety of ways –
ranging from specific lender-of-last-resort actions and policies fostering homebuilding and home
ownership to matters as general as limited liability – may have given both managers and
shareholders incentives to put their institutions, and ultimately the taxpayers and the economy, at
excessive risk.  (4) Participants in the relevant financial markets, especially including mortgage
borrowers, originators, securitizers and investors, may not have understood the risks inherent in
the positions they and their institutions were taking.  Any or all of these influences may have
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been at work in creating the worst financial crisis since the depression of the 1930s, and the work
needed to sort out the relative importance of each will no doubt occupy economists and other
empirical researchers for some time to come.
Hypothesis (4), however – that key market participants failed to understand the relevant
risks – lies outside the bounds of today’s conventionally accepted modes of economic analysis. 
The very first of the seminal papers under retrospective review at this conference, for example,
the 1993 classic by Franklin Allen and Gary Gorton, specifies a lengthy series of assumptions
underlying the authors’ analysis.  The crucial one for this purpose is Assumption 14: “All agents
know the structure of the model and the distributions of the random variables, but do not observe
the particular realizations of random variables.”1  The notion that some realizations are
unobserved is hardly restrictive.  By contrast, the assumption that all agents (act as if they) know
the processes that govern those realizations, including the structural relations among them as well
as the distributions of the underlying random influences – in other words, the standard “rational
expectations” assumption that has governed most economic analysis for the past four decades –
is the heart of the matter.
Although economists have long been aware of evidence, in part from psychology and
other fields, that contradicts the standard full-rationality assumption (hence the burgeoning field
of “behavioral finance”),2 the convention nonetheless has been to maintain the assumption that
whatever departures exist do not matter for macroeconomic outcomes.  But the recent financial
crisis clearly had macroeconomic consequences.  In the United States the subsequent downturn in
real economic activity was the steepest since the 1930s.  The loss of wealth, in the value of both
houses and equity claims to the stock of corporate capital, also set a post World War II record.  
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The real dislocations in many markets, beginning with but not limited to residential construction,
remain readily apparent.  If expectations by market participants that violated Allen and Gorton’s
Assumption 14 were a significant factor underlying the crisis, they certainly did have
macroeconomic implications.  The further implication that follows is that attempting to analyze
the crisis while maintaining this assumption – or, perhaps more important, assessing potential
new policy measures and regimes while doing so – is a highly limited endeavor and may
ultimately prove fruitless.
Although it is too soon to evaluate the evidence systematically, by now there has been a
steady accumulation of indications that during the run-up to the crisis many key market
participants, including not just individuals of modest wealth but highly paid professionals
working at major financial institutions, indeed did not understand the risks they were facing.  At
the broadest level, the evaluations that the major credit rating agencies applied to securities
backed by home mortgages, especially subprime mortgages and especially those issued in 2006
and 2007, were strikingly at variance with the subsequent default experience of the underlying
loans.3  Many forms of derivative contracts priced against these and similar securities also
appear, in retrospect, to have been widely mis-priced.  At a more technical level, recent research
has shown that the “copula” models many firms used to price these and other related securities
had serious analytical flaws.4  To be clear, the question at issue is not what was, or should have
been, the market’s best estimate of any given future outcome; it is the assessment, and hence the
pricing, of the risk associated with those outcomes.
Accumulating anecdotal evidence further drives home that it was often the largest firms –
the ones whose managers and employees should be most likely to think and behave as the
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standard rationality assumption indicates – that made the biggest mistakes.  The losses on
derivatives contracts incurred by insurance giant AIG, which in September 2008 forced U.S.
taxpayers to put $182 billion into rescuing the firm, represent one well known example.  Another
is Merrill Lynch, which in December 2007 sold off its portfolio of mortgage-backed securities at
a loss of $18 billion.  In September 2008 the firm was taken over by Bank of America, which
was apparently acting under pressure from the U.S. Treasury Department.  Merrill’s internal
estimate of the value at risk on this portfolio was $92 million – smaller by more than two orders
of magnitude.5  
Other large, well known firms made similar errors, often with similar resulting need for
rescue.  Royal Bank of Scotland, which the British government took over in October 2008,
incurred losses of $15 billion on its portfolio; the firm’s internally estimated VaR was $22
million – nearly three orders of magnitude smaller.  Zurich-based UBS, which the Swiss
government had to rescue that same month by setting up a classic “bad bank” called the
StabFund, lost $38 billion; the VaR that UBS had estimated was $636 million.6  U.S. investment
bank Morgan Stanley, which survived intact (albeit with substantial loan support from the
Federal Reserve System after the firm hurriedly converted itself to bank form), lost $14 billion on
its portfolio; its estimated VaR was $83 million.
Was the decline in house prices and the consequent sequence of events that precipitated
the crisis simply an extraordinary event that could not, and therefore should not, have been
factored into the risk structure market participants saw themselves facing?  To repeat, the issue
here is not what market participants should have expected, but what risk they should have
attached to their expectations.  Perhaps what happened in the U.S. mortgage market was the
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proverbial “six-sigma,” or even “ten-sigma,” event.  No one goes out of his or her way to avoid
being struck by lightening on a clear day, or being crushed by an unseen piano falling to the
sidewalk from an upper-story window.
But the history of financial crises that have occurred just within recent decades has
thrown up too many supposed six- (or ten-) sigma events to be credible.  Many people made the
same claim when Long Term Capital Management had to be rescued in 1998, in the midst of the
“Asian financial crisis” and the turmoil surrounding Russia’s debt obligations.  Before that the
same notion emerged after a series of problems involving real estate and leveraged buy-out
transactions impaired many of the country’s banks in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and before
that in the “Latin American debt crisis” of the early 1980s.  When six-sigma events occur with
this frequency, they are not six-sigma events.
One of the most senior officials at Citigroup, which was involved in each of these
episodes, has publicly expressed a similar view.  In the early stages of the most recent crisis, Citi
took losses totaling $55 billion, more than any other bank.  It was also centrally involved, with
losses that at times became institution-threatening, in each of the prior crises.  Looking back over
this decades-long series of mishaps, and referring not just to Citi but to other banks as well,
William Rhodes, the chairman of Citibank and senior vice chairman of Citigroup at the time of
the most recent crisis, subsequently referred to “flawed analyses” and wrote, “Clearly, time and
time again, economic and market trends were not accurately assessed.”  Referring more
specifically to Citi’s real estate losses in the early 1990s, Rhodes quoted the bank’s then-CEO
John Reed as saying “we did not understand the risks in the financial environment or the work
that Citibank was undertaking within it.”7
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At a more formal level, we also have both evidence and models for the kind of systematic
error that many of these episodes, including the most recent crisis, appear to represent.  Another
of the seminal contributions under review at this conference, Jose Sheinkman and Wei Xiong’s
1993 paper, today looks prescient in exactly this regard.  Sheinkman and Xiong based their
analysis on “heterogeneous beliefs generated by agents’ overconfidence.”  And they referred in
turn to Michael Harrison and David Kreps’s earlier (1978) insight that “when agents agree to
disagree and short selling is not possible, asset prices may exceed their fundamental value.”8 
(One could readily extend the result to cases in which short selling is merely restricted, or
expensive.)  As they acknowledged, today there is ample evidence, again much of it from the
psychology and behavioral literatures, of systematic overconfidence in a wide variety of settings.
Why, then, has the economics profession – especially the profession’s macroeconomics
wing – been so reluctant to abandon Assumption 14?  I believe two forces are at work.
First, abandoning or even seriously weakening the full-rationality assumption would be
deeply subversive of the all-important role of markets in allocating scarce resources, including,
most importantly for purposes of this conference, the role of the financial markets in allocating
capital investment.  As is often the case, most of the attention in the wake of the recent crisis has
focused on the financial losses that investors, banks, and other institutions took on the assets they
held that declined in value.  But the essential role of the financial markets in a capitalist economy
is to allocate the economy’s scarce investment capital.  (The financial markets serve other
functions as well, such as operating the payments mechanism and providing liquidity and various
forms of insurance; but in notable contrast to the allocation of capital, there are well established
public utility models for each of these.)  Mispricing of assets and subsequent losses to their
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holders matter in themselves, but they are also – and more fundamentally – the financial
reflection of an underlying misallocation of real resources.
In the most recent crisis, for example, the greatest amount of discussion has focused on
the losses investors incurred on their holdings of mortgages, mortgage-backed securities and
related derivative instruments.  But the fact that the mortgages were overpriced means that the
corresponding interest rate was too low, with the result that Americans built and bought far too
many houses – millions of which are now empty or unpaid for, or financed with unserviced debt
and facing potential foreclosure.  Similarly, in the aftermath of the “dot.com” bubble of the late
1990s, most of the attention focused on the losses investors incurred on their positions in telecom
stocks.  But the fact that the stock prices were too high meant that the cost of capital to the firms
issuing them was too low, with the result that firms in the industry laid hundreds of millions of
mile of fiber-optic cable that have never been lit and probably never will be.
Second, abandoning the full-rationality assumption poses a major analytical challenge.  A
familiar maxim holds that you can’t beat something with nothing.  The full-rationality
assumption provides a way of disciplining analysis in which forward-looking behavior is of the
essence – as is inevitably the case when the economic setting of interest encompasses speculative
securities markets.  For all the debate over “rational” expectations since the introduction of this
methodology into macroeconomics nearly four decades ago, and even despite substantial research
into models of “limited” (or “bounded”) rationality, there is today no readily evident alternative
to provide a comparable discipline on such lines of research.
Here again, the literature following from one of the seminal papers under review in this
conference serves as an example.  Implicit in Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler’s 1989 paper
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(although they did not emphasize the point in just this way) was the idea that a decline in the net
worth of either banks or their borrowers would diminish banks’ willingness to lend, all else
equal, and hence would trigger both a decline in lending volume and an increase in lending rates,
and via both of those mechanisms would depress real economic activity.  (The effect stemming
from a decline in borrowers’ net worth reflects the role of collateral in loan arrangements.)  The
idea is important for purposes of this conference’s inquiry in that it provides a way of
understanding the positive feedback running from rising/declining asset prices to rising/declining
economic activity and net worth, and on to further rising/declining asset prices.  Much work
since then – for example, the pair of now-classic 1997 papers by Bengt Holmstrom and Jean
Tirole and by Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore – has fleshed out the micro-foundations of this
mechanism.  More recent work – for example, the 2011 paper by Mark Gertler and Peter Karadi,
and the 2010 paper by Andrea Gerali and co-authors on the Euro-area – has brought this line of
analysis to bear more directly on pertinent issues of monetary policy, including policy in a crisis
like the recent one.
But all of this analysis – the original idea from Bernanke and Gertler, the subsequent
micro-foundations, and the more recent applications to monetary policy in the crisis – rests on the
full-rationality assumption.  To the extent that market participants’ failure to understand the risks
they were incurring, either personally or on behalf of the financial institutions for which they
worked, was central to what happened in the crisis, therefore, this entire line of research, and
others like it too, are unlikely to get at the essence of the matter.  They are, in effect, handcuffed
by Assumption 14.
Macroeconomics sorely needs a disciplined alternative to the full-rationality assumption,
-9-
and when one emerges it will represent a fundamental revolution in economic methodology
comparable to the rational expectations revolution of four decades ago.  As was the case then,
economists will look back at the years of accumulating evidence and wonder that the full-
rationality assumption ever held sway – just as people four decades ago remarked that the pre-
rational expectations literature seemed to imply that policymakers could “fool all the people all
the time,” or that economic agents regularly “left $50 bills lying on the sidewalk.”  But the
profession is not there yet.
What kind of progress, then, can we make while we wait for this analytical lacuna to be
remedied?  Several new directions, at both the positive and the normative levels, seem possible
despite this overarching impediment to more fundamental progress. 
To begin, it is important to recognize that while price stability (a low mean and small
variance for whatever measure of an economy’s inflation is taken to be most relevant) is an
important policy objective in itself, it is not sufficient to guarantee favorable, or even acceptable,
macroeconomic outcomes more generally.  As James Tobin often said, there are worse things
than three percent inflation.  The American economy has just experienced some of them.
Second, in the wake of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s – involving the collapse
of major financial firms, large-scale declines in asset values and the consequent destruction of
citizens’ wealth, the interruption of credit flows, the loss of confidence both in firms and in credit
market instruments, the widespread fear of default by counter-parties, and ultimately the need for
extraordinary (in both scale and scope) intervention by central banks and other governmental
institutions – it is also important to acknowledge that “market discipline” enforced by creditors is
not sufficient to prevent financial institutions from taking actions that, collectively, prove
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publicly harmful.  There is therefore a need for regulation and/or supervision of financial
institutions to prevent what amounts to a straightforward externality.  Indeed, the importance of
just this externality and the consequent need for regulatory measures to contain it have a
distinguished pedigree in economics.  Adam Smith, writing the Wealth of Nations in the
aftermath of Scotland’s worst banking crisis in two generations, favored not only restrictions on
how banks could fund themselves but also limits on the interest rates they could charge on loans. 
Smith explained that he favored these measures for the same reasons he favored laws requiring
firewalls between houses in Edinburgh.
The experience of the crisis and the subsequent downturn in real economic activity made
clear the limited capacity of monetary policy, even including the “unconventional” measures that
many central banks have taken in this episode, to correct such a situation once it is in progress
and especially once short-term interest rates have reached the zero lower bound.  Further, a
growing body of research casts doubt on the usefulness of potential rules that would relate the
central bank’s interest rate setting to levels of asset prices with an eye toward arresting the crisis
while it is still developing.   The resulting danger for economic thinking is analogous to what led
macroeconomics to focus on “real” business cycle theories.  The logic there was that (a) everyone
knows that monetary shocks are the only demand shocks worth considering, but (b) the evidence
increasingly indicated that fluctuations in the money stock, however measured, are not
systematically related to fluctuations in economic activity, and therefore (c) demand shocks as a
category must be irrelevant for economic fluctuations.  Today an all-too-familiar presumption in
macroeconomics is that monetary policy is the only policy worth considering; if monetary policy
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cannot do much about asset price bubbles and their consequences, the analogous logic would
imply, then no policy is worth considering.  Smith knew better.  So should we.
What policy measures do we then require?  With the 2010 Dodd-Frank legislation now
behind us, the most pressing need is to move forward with stricter capital requirements on
leveraged financial institutions, especially including those that, on account of size or
“interconnectedness” or both, pose potential systemic risks.  Importantly, however, effective
reform of capital requirements is not merely a matter of specifying higher stated capital ratios or
even more finely tuned capital ratios pegged to the riskiness of the assets on an institution’s
balance sheet.  Two more elements are needed.  One is accounting reform.  As the experience of
some of the largest U.S. institutions in the crisis revealed, often what matters for capital
adequacy is not the numerical ratio but the quantity to which it applies.  Assets hidden off the
balance sheet are, in effect, subject to zero capital requirement regardless of the stated required
ratio.  
The other missing element is clearly specified resolution procedures.  The Dodd-Frank
legislation usefully expanded the government’s resolution authority to include endangered
financial institutions other than banks (for example, bank holding companies, broker/dealers and
insurance companies), but it did not lay out what procedures the relevant agencies would use,
within that authority, if such an institution becomes undercapitalized.  In general, requirements
are effective only if some consequence follows on the failure to meet them.  Capital requirements
are no different.  It is precisely the awareness of the consequences of failing to do so that should
keep institutions in compliance.
-12-
As the crisis has also made clear, however, there is also a deeper principle of political
economy at work.  In a democracy like America’s, if the voters elect to public office individuals
who do not believe in regulation, and those office holders appoint people of like mind to head the
principal agencies that constitute the nation’s regulatory apparatus, then there will not be
effective regulation regardless of the prevailing statutes and rules.  The public may or may not
get the regulation it deserves, but it does get the regulation it chooses.
Finally, in the wake of the recent crisis it is also worth asking a yet more fundamental
question that is also implicit in the entire subject of asset price “bubbles,” and that is likewise
intimately connected to the implications of the full-rationality assumption in economics:  Is our
financial system serving us well, as judged by both the way it does its job and what it costs us to
do that?9  
As much recent literature has emphasized, especially in the United States the financial
system has always been large and in recent years it has gotten substantially larger.  To recall, the
essential function of the financial system in a capitalist economy is to allocate scarce investment
capital.  Seen in this perspective, the U.S. economy’s mechanism for allocating its capital has
been getting more expensive not just absolutely but compared to the total returns earned on the
capital being allocated.  From the 1950s through the 1980s, profits earned by financial firms (not
counting insurance companies and firms in the real estate business) represented 10 percent of all
profits earned in the U.S. economy.  In the 1990s financial firms’ share of total profits rose to 22
percent.  And in the first half of the last decade – that is, until just before the crisis – these firms’
share of all U.S. profits reached 34 percent.10  
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Further, this significant share of the profits earned by U.S. business is far from the total
cost of running the economy’s financial system.  That cost also includes the salaries financial
firms pay to their work force and the rents they pay for their office space (including the rental
equivalent for firms that own their own buildings), as well as more mundane elements like all the
associated utility bills, travel tickets and advertising budgets.  Like its share of economywide
profits earned, the finance industry’s share of all U.S. wages and salaries paid has also been
rising in recent decades.  Fifty years ago it was 3 percent; more recently it has been 7 percent.11 
The standard argument is that these high salaries (including the eight-figure bonuses for those at
the top) are necessary to attract the talent that enables these firms to do their job.  If this is true, it
means that the economy’s capital allocation mechanism is inherently all the more expensive to
operate.  The same principle applies to the financial sector’s other expenses.  It may be true that
without lavishly furnished offices in choice locations, or lots of prime-time television
advertising, the capital allocation mechanism would not be able to serve its function.  But if so,
this means that the necessary cost of running it is all the greater.  
And, here as elsewhere, the basic principle of a market economy holds: expenses paid are
the counterpart of resources used.  At my university, for example, more than one-fourth of the
graduates in recent classes have gone to work at investment banks, hedge funds, private equity
firms and the like.  These talented and energetic young people could be doing something else.  If
they are not really needed in the financial firms that employ so many of them – if what they do
there actually adds little or no economic value – then something is seriously wrong with yet
another market that allocates our economy’s resources (in particular, the labor market).  But if
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the financial sector is the best place to use their talents and energies, that need is yet another part
of what makes our economy’s capital allocation mechanism so expensive to run.  
At the same time that the financial sector has been growing ever more expensive to
operate – absorbing a larger fraction of the economy’s total profits, claiming a larger share of the
most talented workers, and so on – the economy’s performance has been disappointing.  Wholly
apart from the recent housing bubble and all of the economic costs associated with its demise
(costs which must be subtracted from the economic benefits the financial sector delivers), there is
less about which to cheer in the aggregate gains accruing to capital investment either.  How much
of the disappointing performance of U.S. productivity growth in recent experience is due to poor
allocation of capital?  The truth is that no one knows.
An important task for the economic profession, therefore, is to gain some well-grounded
quantitative understanding both of how good a job the financial sector is doing at allocating our
economy’s investment capital and of what it is costing on an all-in basis. Neither is the focus of
today’s conference – at least not directly – but any measure of the overall cost must include the
risk of the occasional melt-downs to which asset price bubbles expose us.  And the answers we
find may turn out to bear on how much longer we will be willing to continue to constrain our
analysis within the confines of Assumption 14.
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